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The letter and spirit of the Code 
4.1 The lawyer joke 
A layperson, an accountant and a lawyer were all asked: ‘What do two and two make?’ 
The layperson replied: ‘Four, of course.’ 
The accountant replied: ‘Four—or five.’ 
The lawyer replied: ‘What do you want it to make?’ 
Lawyers are the butt of many jokes, many of which flow from a perception that lawyers are 
capable of acting quite unethically in pursuit of their client’s interests. While this perception 
has, fortunately, never developed in the UK to the extent that it has in the USA, the 
characteristics of practice in common law jurisdictions expose lawyers to many ethical 
dilemmas, and responses to these vary. This chapter (and indeed this manual) will provide 
you with some answers, but in other areas it will simply provide you with a framework within 
which you will still have to make your own decisions. In these cases it should provide you 
with tools and ideas which may help you to arrive at conclusions which satisfy the ethical 
demands of practice. 
The issues have been neatly presented by Ross Cranston: 
An important policy issue is the extent to which the Code of Conduct ought to be infused by 
wider ethical notions. There are two aspects to this. One is encapsulated in the question: ‘Can 
a good lawyer be a bad person?’. In other words, are the standards in the Code of Conduct 
untenable when laid alongside ethical thought or common morality? The second aspect is that 
if there is a discrepancy between the Code of Conduct and secular ethical thought, what is 
special about barristers that exempts them from the precepts of the latter? To put it another 
way, how is it that barristers can decide ethically on a course of action for a client which is 
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different from that which they would adopt for themselves? 
(Cranston, R (ed.), Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) 
The Bar Standards Board recognises this dilemma. Amongst the things it requires you to 
achieve on the BPTC are ‘knowledge and understanding of the philosophical issues and 
purposes underpinning ethical behaviour’.1 More specifically, you are expected to 
‘understand and appreciate the core professional values which underpin practice at the Bar or 
England and Wales, particularly the additional moral responsibilities held by the profession 
(over and above the population in general) due to decision-making roles, functions and 
authority which are key to practice at the Bar’. 
4.2 The Code of Conduct 
The Bar Code of Conduct provides you with the rules and standards that should inform all 
aspects of your practice at the Bar. It looks, at first sight, very much like a statute and this 
recognition should lead you to approach it with respect, but also to consider carefully how 
you should use it. It is not a statute, but a Code of Conduct. Bear in mind that it is supported 
by Guidance, available through the Bar Council and Bar Standards Board websites. 
There is a risk that, if the Code is perceived as essentially like any other piece of 
legislation, you will approach it in the same way. Why should this be a problem? It stems 
from the underlying principle within UK substantive law that all actions are permitted unless 
they are forbidden. Thus Acts that regulate behaviour are to be construed in a restrictive 
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manner and loopholes may properly be exploited. 
For example, the Theft Act 1968 s 9 provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if: 
(a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to steal 
anything in the building or part of a building in question, to inflict on any person in 
it any grievous bodily harm or to rape any woman in it, or to do unlawful damage to 
the building or anything in it; or 
(b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser, he steals or 
attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to 
inflict on any person in it any grievous bodily harm. 
Your client has entered a building as a trespasser but with no particular intention, and, once 
inside decides to do unlawful damage to property within the building. Your advice to him 
should be to plead not guilty to a charge of burglary. This is because his actions fall within 
neither paragraph of the subsection even though his actions have produced the same result as 
behaviour which would lead to guilt (had he formed the intention to cause the damage before, 
rather than after entering the building). This conclusion may be hard for a layperson to 
understand but would be natural to any lawyer versed in statutory interpretation. 
To adopt the same approach to following the Code may enable you to avoid successful 
disciplinary proceedings by the Bar Standards Board. In other words, in so far as it acts in an 
analogous manner to a criminal statute, the Code may be treated in the same way. However, 
to approach the Code in this way could carry dangers for the reputation of the profession. 
Your interpretation of the Code should be informed by ethical values and where the Code 
permits a variety of responses your choice between them should be similarly informed. This 
is why the Bar Standards Board requires that you understand these underpinning values. 
An example of how the Code regulates your professional response arises from para 704: 
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704 A barrister must not devise facts which will assist in advancing the lay client’s case and 
must not draft any statement of case, witness statement, affidavit, notice of appeal or other 
document containing: 
[. . .] 
(c) any allegation of fraud unless he has clear instructions to make such allegation and 
has before him reasonably credible material which as it stands establishes a prima 
facie case of fraud; 
The concept of ‘reasonably credible material’ inherently carries a degree of subjectivity. 
Suppose that you have been instructed by your lay client that the opponent has been 
perpetrating a fraud. It is not uncommon for hostility between the parties to lead to all sorts of 
allegations which are discovered later to be impossible of formal proof. That being the case, 
it would be unwise to incorporate such an allegation into any draft on the client’s assertion 
alone. What, however, if the client (who has behaved in a temperate manner throughout) tells 
you that the opposing party has admitted to committing fraud, but no other independent 
evidence is available? What if, in addition, the client is prepared to make a statement of truth 
in respect of this allegation? Would such a statement be ‘reasonably credible material’ given 
that it is in essence no more than the original assertion presented formally in a way which is 
admissible in court? Should you still insist on some independent evidence? 
In practical terms you would doubtless advise your professional client to seek independent 
evidence to corroborate your lay client’s oral evidence before settling a statement of case 
which contained an allegation of fraud. If it is not forthcoming, should you pursue the 
allegation? The only guidance the Code offers is that the material must be credible and 
establish a prima facie case. The assertion of an intemperate client would clearly be 
inadequate (it is the mischief the rule is designed to avoid). To rely on a statement of truth 
may be sufficient to avoid a finding of misconduct (although if there were no other evidence 
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the client should be advised of the dangers of pressing the matter in court: a wasted costs 
order may loom). However, to refuse to incorporate such an allegation in those circumstances 
will upset your client, and is likely to upset them more if the allegations are in fact well 
founded. You must not let your independence be compromised (para 307(a) and (c)), yet you 
should act on your client’s behalf (para 303(a)). 
Note that the House of Lords’ decision in Medcalf v Mardell and others [2003] 1 AC 120 
(for details see 7.5.4.2), while addressing this area, does not resolve this issue. If you check 
the specific guidance on this matter on the Bar Council website you will find: 
The Professional Standards Committee (PSC) takes the view that there is no litmus test for 
determining whether it is proper to allege fraud. As Lord Bingham made clear at para 22: 
‘Counsel is bound to exercise an objective professional judgment whether it is in all 
circumstances proper to lend his name to the allegation’. That decision will depend on the 
individual facts of each case. 
It should be noted that although paragraph 704 refers specifically to fraud, the same principle 
would apply to any other allegation of serious misconduct. 
No doubt you should err on the side of caution and advise that further evidence should be 
obtained if possible, but it may not be available. Moreover, if, after settling the statement of 
case, it becomes clear that there is no credible evidence of fraud (for example, the opposing 
party may have made the admission to provoke a reaction or as an act of bravado) or if other 
facts come to light showing that the allegation of fraud has no prospect of success, you will 
no doubt recognise that the fraud allegation should no longer be pursued. It is submitted that 
the proper approach is not to seek a ‘way around’ the provisions of the Code, but to consider 
underlying values, so that your response is likely to assist to maintain the Bar’s reputation as 
a thoroughly ethical profession. Fortunately, problems as awkward as this should not be a 
daily occurrence, and you should remember that advice will be available from your Head of 
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Chambers or from the Bar Council. 
An understanding of the underpinning values will give you a basis for deciding ethical 
questions beyond what the Code provides. Remember that behaviour prohibited by the Code 
is not made acceptable by a contrary underpinning value, but an underpinning value might 
validate conduct upon which the Code is silent or in circumstances which generate conflict 
between its provisions. Ultimately, where, having thought through matters in this degree of 
depth, you remain uncertain as to the proper way of proceeding, you should contact the Bar 
Council Ethical Queries Helpline available for advice in emergencies. 
4.3 Underpinning values 
Here are a number of values which may be said to underpin the Code of Practice. It is not 
intended to be exhaustive. 
• Justice. 
• Respect for the law. 
• Client autonomy. 
• Confidentiality. 
• Honesty. 
How these values apply to the demands of practice at the Bar may best be understood by 
reading them in the context of the core principles identified by the Bar Standards Board as 
underpinning the Code and Bar Council guidance. These are: 
• the principle of professional independence; 
• the principle of integrity; 
• the principle of duty to the court; 
• the principle of loyalty to the lay client; 
• an understanding of the problems and perception of conflict of interest; 
• the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, 
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nationality, citizenship, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, disability, age, religion or 
belief; and 
• commitment to maintaining the highest professional standards of work, to the proper 
and efficient administration of justice, and to the Rule of Law.2 
4.3.1 Conflict in underpinning values 
Conflict between values is inherent in legal practice. Lord Reid makes this clear in his 
opinion in Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, 227: 
Every counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly to raise every issue, advance every argument 
and ask every question, however distasteful, which he thinks will help his client’s case. But, 
as an officer of the court concerned with the administration of justice, he has an overriding 
duty to the court, to the standards of his profession, and to the public, which may and often 
does lead to a conflict with his client’s wishes or what the client thinks are his personal 
wishes. 
Consider a concrete situation. If your client in a criminal matter has provided you with 
information which is relevant (but adverse) to your case you will be faced with a conflict 
between maintaining confidentiality and not misleading the court. A perusal of the Code will 
throw up relevant provisions. 
104 The general purpose of this Code is to provide the requirements for practice as a barrister 
and the rules and standards of conduct applicable to barristers which are appropriate in the 
interests of justice and in particular: 







(a) in relation to self-employed barristers to provide common and enforceable rules and 
standards which require them: 
(i) to be completely independent in conduct and in professional standing as sole 
practitioners; 
(ii) to act only as consultants instructed by solicitors and other approved persons; 
(iii) to acknowledge a public obligation based on the paramount need for access to 
justice to act for any client in cases within their field of practice; 
[. . .] 
301 A barrister must have regard to paragraph 104 and must not: 
(a) engage in conduct whether in pursuit of his profession or otherwise which is: 
(i) dishonest or otherwise discreditable to a barrister; 
(ii) prejudicial to the administration of justice; or 
(iii) likely to diminish public confidence in the legal profession or the administration 
of justice or otherwise bring the legal profession into disrepute;. . . 
302 A barrister has an overriding duty to the Court to act with independence in the interests 
of justice: he must assist the Court in the administration of justice and must not deceive or 
knowingly or recklessly mislead the Court. 
[. . .] 
702 Whether or not the relation of counsel and client continues a barrister must preserve the 
confidentiality of the lay client’s affairs and must not without the prior consent of the lay 
client or as permitted by law lend or reveal the contents of the papers in any instructions to or 
communicate to any third person (other than another barrister, a pupil . . . or any other person 
who needs to know it for the performance of their duties) information which has been 
entrusted to him in confidence or use such information to the lay client’s detriment or to his 
own or another client’s advantage. 
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[. . .] 
708 A barrister when conducting proceedings in Court: . . . 
(e) must not adduce evidence obtained otherwise than from or through the client or devise 
facts which will assist in advancing the lay client’s case; 
These rules are helpful in identifying what is expected in relation to each of the underlying 
values. However, they provide little guidance as to how conflicts should be resolved. In fact, 
the conflict identified occurs so regularly in practice that a proper way of responding is well 
established. You will not necessarily be required to withdraw unless your client wishes you to 
present information you now know to be incorrect. Your precise duties will depend on the 
nature of the information being withheld. This may range from a full confession to dishonesty 
in obtaining public funding or an indication of past offences of which the prosecution appears 
to be unaware. You will find detailed guidance as to how to respond ethically to these 
different situations at 7.2 below. 
Note that further guidance on the preparation of witness statements is available on the Bar 
Standards Board website. This is expressly described as applying to civil matters only, as 
barristers do not draft witness statements in criminal cases. Thus you should note that striking 
a balance between different values might produce different results in the criminal and the 
civil context. 
This itself throws up an important value, associated with client autonomy and justice. Our 
adversarial system of justice requires as close as possible an approach to equality of arms. 
The assumption is that representation by competent and qualified lawyers achieves that 
equality. In a civil matter the parties are to some extent equal (although one may be able to 
spend more money than the other in preparing the case). In a criminal matter, however, it is 
normal to find individuals (often impecunious and possibly facing loss of liberty) with all the 




• the cab-rank rule, which requires barristers to accept any case which is within their 
competence and ability to undertake (there are exceptions—see Part VI of the Code); 
and 
• the lesser expectations to disclose adverse factual information in criminal, as opposed to 
civil matters (given that the task is for the prosecution to prove the case, not for the 
defendant to prove his innocence). 
So your response to a clash of underlying values may need to differ depending on the context. 
You may find yourself in a situation where you face such a clash of values or where you 
are challenged by a client holding different values to your own. Consider the following 
situations. 
EXAMPLE 
What if my client is impecunious and facing a wealthy opponent? 
For example, you are acting pro bono for an unemployed client who claims to have 
been unfairly dismissed for fighting at work. Your professional client instructs you to 
contact the respondent’s lawyers in order to seek a settlement. The evidence from a 
number of witnesses and from personnel records suggests that your client had, indeed, 
been fighting, had done so on many occasions, and was only dismissed after proper 
warnings had been given. In conference, however, your client continues to deny the 
allegation while offering no explanation for the evidence against him. You are 
confident that should the matter proceed to trial your client will lose. You are, 
however, aware that many cases can result in a technical finding of unfair dismissal for 
procedural failings, even if the compensation in such cases is likely to be minimal. 
Your lay client has indicated that he is willing to accept £3,000 in settlement. You 
recognise, moreover, that for the employer to defend the claim, should you make many 
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demands on them for disclosure or further questions, will cost them well over £3,000. 
Should you contact the employer, pointing out that the hearing will be a long one and 
that you will be requiring considerable disclosure of documents and answers to detailed 
questions about personnel practices in the firm, suggesting that your client will 
withdraw the case if they pay £3,000 in settlement? To do so would promote the value 
of client autonomy and (by subverting the normal consequences of inequalities in 
wealth) promote a particular view of social justice. 
Should you, instead, avoid putting that pressure on the employer when negotiating, 
recognising that this might make it less likely that the employer will settle for £3,000? 
To do so would promote the values of respect for the law and a particular (but 
different) perception of justice. 
The Code does not prevent either course, provided you are acting on your client’s 
instructions after giving proper advice. This is thus one example where your own 
values may have an impact on your choice of whether to use the ‘we’ll make this 
expensive for you’ tactic. 
What if my client is seeking to achieve, by instructing me, a goal which I regard as 
immoral? 
For example, your clients, who are a couple seeking to have an exceptionally bright 
child, wish to carry out genetic checks to screen out any foetuses which appear not to 
be intelligent. You feel strongly that this is an abuse of the genetic research which has 
been done. Although the motive appears to be one which is forbidden under the 
relevant legislation you understand that similar checks (which are permitted) can 
indirectly provide information which would enable them to screen for intelligence. 
Should you simply advise them that their proposed course of action would contravene 
the law and that they should not therefore attempt to pursue it? To do so may promote 
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the value of (your particular view of) morality. This itself will be based on a value such 
as the integrity of the individual (in this case the unconceived child). 
Should you, instead, indicate how they might achieve their goal without technically 
breaking the law? To do so would promote the value of client autonomy. 
When considering the propriety of your response you must remember that your duty 
is to act for your client and you should not make moral judgments about your client’s 
actions. You should also consider what your client needs to know in order to make a 
properly informed decision. These principles are addressed in the Code and clearly 
prioritise the value of client autonomy. 
What if my client is seeking to achieve, by instructing me, a goal which involves a 
breach of the law? 
For example, you are instructed by solicitors to advise a corporate client which wishes 
to reduce some of its production costs. The proposed savings will increase the risk of a 
release of toxic chemicals into a river. Such a release will constitute a breach of 
regulations designed to protect the environment and expose the client company to the 
risk of fines. However, you are aware that the local authority with responsibility for 
enforcing those regulations is extremely short of finance and is unable to make regular 
checks. A minor release is therefore unlikely to be noticed. 
Should your advice be to explain the legal situation and simply point out that the 
proposed cost reductions place the company at risk of committing an illegal action for 
which they might suffer a penalty? To do so may promote the value of respect for the 
law. 
Should your advice extend to your assessment of the very small risk of discovery? To 
do so may promote the value of client autonomy. 
Does the principle indicated in the previous example (that you should not make moral 
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judgments about your client’s actions) apply equally here, when the proposed action 
involves your client committing a criminal offence? The Code indicates that you must 
do nothing dishonest or bring the profession into disrepute. Incitement to break the law 
clearly falls within that concept. You can therefore protect yourself from breach of the 
Code by giving clear advice not to break the law. However, you may be doing that in 
the realistic knowledge that your client may well ignore you and break the law. Note 
that if this has occurred to you it is probably your own sensitivity to ethical issues that 
alerts you to the risk that this may have the effect of indirectly inciting a breach of the 
law. 
You will see that none of these three examples produces a single, clearly correct answer. 
Regrettably, this may well arise in practice. I have my personal preferences as to the most 
appropriate response, but you may well take a different view. Any such difference will flow 
in part from the personal values that you or I espouse. For this reason we need to be aware of 
those values and how they impact on our responses when faced with ethical dilemmas (as we 
undoubtedly will be). At the same time it is important that we remember that we must not 
apply our personal values unrestrained. As barristers, we are bound by the Code and that 
recognition may assist when you are faced with a conflict of potentially applicable values. 
You cannot justify a departure from the clear requirements of the Code by pleading an 
inconsistent personal value, no matter how strongly you espouse it. 
4.4 Role morality 
One concept which may assist in resolving conflicts of this sort is that of role morality. A 
lawyer may be required to do something for a client which she could not morally justify 
doing for herself. That proposition may initially appear to be wrong, or at least 
counterintuitive. However, it is explained to a degree by the recognition that the basis of 
litigation in the UK is adversarialism. The lawyer is the skilled partisan advocate of the client 
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and is (in theory) opposed by a similarly skilled partisan advocate for the opponent. The 
neutral decision-maker is neither lawyer but the tribunal. 
This concept only works if the lawyer is genuinely partisan and the parties are equitably 
resourced. A client whose lawyer adopts a neutral role will be severely disadvantaged if 
opposed by a client whose lawyer adopts a partisan approach. In order to shoulder this burden 
properly, lawyers may well have to seek to achieve conclusions of which they disapprove, or 
carry out actions which they would not carry out on their own behalf. To justify this, many 
have introduced the idea of ‘role morality’. This concept prioritises the value of client 
autonomy and is the source of the cab-rank rule (see Code para 601). Many lawyers regard it 
as enabling them to do for their clients what they would not do for themselves. 
It may have surprising consequences. As Boon and Levin point out: 
Paradoxically, whilst lawyers are expected to act cooperatively, altruistically and ethically 
when dealing with their clients, they are expected to be uncooperative, selfish and possibly 
unethical in pursuing the objectives of their clients. This creates considerable moral strain, . . . 
(Boon, A and Levin, J, The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and Wales 
(Oxford: Hart, 2nd ed, 2008) at 192) 
That moral strain will alert you to the fact that while the concept of role morality may 
justify your doing for your client what you would not do for yourself, it does not give you 
guidance as to how far you can go. Take an example. 
EXAMPLE 
It may well be that if you clearly owed a debt you would not take advantage of the 
limitation provisions to evade it. However, would you apply the same moral judgment 
if it were your client who owed the debt? Suppose, for example, your client is very 
short of money and had forgotten the debt, which is owed to a large corporation? 




Your view may be identical in those two situations or you may regard their relative wealth as 
a key issue. That is a matter for you. However, identifying the issue should make it clear that 
role morality, while potentially justifying actions which you would feel uncomfortable about 
on your own behalf, does not resolve questions about whether a particular course of action is 
ethically acceptable. For that, once again, you need to follow the Code and, where necessary, 
consider your underlying values. 
The underpinning principle here is client autonomy. The Code permits you to do whatever 
your client wants provided that it is not illegal, you are not dishonest, and you give the court 
the full benefit of your knowledge of the law, whether helpful to your case or not. Equally, 
you must provide your client with advice that helps him or her to take an informed decision 
as to whether to pursue a case or not. It would be improper (as with the second example at 
4.3.1) to prioritise your views over those of your client. There is nothing to stop you 
identifying ethical considerations to your client, but the decision must remain with the client. 
The adversarial nature of the UK legal system may be some justification for a barrister 
behaving differently in professional and personal contexts, but it also carries its own limits to 
professional behaviour. Because (unlike in an inquisitorial system) the court does not have 
the resources to explore the truth for itself, it relies on the honesty of advocates and their 
ability to research the law fully. This is the source of the requirements not to mislead the 
court and to cite authorities that go against your client’s interests. This should identify two 
insights: 
(a) A claim to role morality does not justify all behaviour. A balance between conflicting 
values must still be maintained. This is clear from the Marre Report (para 6.1): 
The client is frequently acting under physical, emotional or financial difficulties and may 
well wish to take every step he can, whether legal or extra-legal, to gain advantage over the 
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other party. In this situation the lawyer has a special duty and responsibility to advise his 
client as to the legal and ethical standards which should be observed and not to participate in 
any deception or sharp practice. 
(Lady Marre, CBE, A Time for Change: Report of the Committee on the Future of the 
Legal Profession (General Council of the Bar and Council of the Law Society, 
London: 1998)) 
This is helpful guidance, but leaves much to the individual lawyer. 
(b) No advocate will be able to meet the standards expected unless the requisite 
knowledge, understanding, and skills have been mastered. The knowledge, 
understanding, and skills that you have acquired in your undergraduate study and which 
you are now developing on your Bar Professional Training Course are central to your 
effectively meeting the demands of an adversarial system. Competence itself is an 
ethical issue. 
For further discussions of role morality, see Boon, A and Levin, J, The Ethics and Conduct of 
Lawyers in England and Wales (Oxford: Hart, 2nd ed. 2008) at 15–17 and 191–194, and 
Nicolson, D and Webb, J, Professional Ethics: Critical Interrogations (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 
at 169–171. 
4.5 Ethical behaviour and self-interest 
It is often said that ethical behaviour is in the individual lawyer’s best interest because ‘the 
Bar is a small profession and your reputation will quickly get around’. Barely hidden behind 
this assertion is the suggestion that if you acquire a reputation for poor ethical standards 
opponents will not trust you and you will find it increasingly difficult to meet your clients’ 
needs. This may be true. However, it is important to recognise that ethics and self-interest 
should not be equated. 
Some help may be available from the recognition that taking a long-term view of self-
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interest is highly likely to be an ethically safer approach than taking a short-term view. Thus, 
an approach which ensures that you have a reputation for honesty is likely to enable you to 
represent many future clients in negotiation. It is also therefore likely to enhance your long-
term income. Willingness to deceive an opponent may achieve something your current client 
values but will inhibit your ability to come to desirable solutions for future clients. Not only 
would this inhibit long-term income, it would involve a breach of the Code (para 301(a)). 
One other aspect of self-interest is worth addressing here. You have an interest in your 
profession continuing to be perceived as in good ethical standing. If you comply with the 
provisions of the Code, this will preserve you from the risk of disciplinary proceedings. 
However, where the Code provides a framework within which different courses of action are 
permitted you should be alert to maintain the highest possible ethical standards. 
This insight helps us to identify those aspects of self-interest which will assist us to 
maintain high ethical standards, but relying on self-interest is altogether insufficient. It 
ignores most of the underpinning values which we have identified earlier and leaves the 
individual lawyer without ethical guidance. Thus it remains necessary to comply with the 
requirements of the Code and to consider its underpinning values in those situations where 
conflicts nevertheless arise. 
4.6 The lawyer joke again 
So which of the three was acting most ethically? I have no problem with the layperson’s 
response and am sufficiently ignorant to accept that there may be justification for the 
accountant’s response. However, to judge the lawyer I need to go back to my core values 
again. If I prioritise client autonomy, this lawyer may be responding perfectly correctly. 
There are few situations in reality where one simple answer is the only one available. The 
lawyer here is seeking the client’s instructions as to what the desired outcome is. It may be 
that that outcome is not legally available, in which case the lawyer should advise the client to 
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that effect. It may be readily available, in which case the lawyer is in the fortunate position of 
giving the client good news. It is just as likely, however, that the answer is somewhere 
between the two. How far should you go to achieve the client’s desired result? That is a 
matter of your professional responsibility. The Code of Conduct is your guide (‘a barrister 
must not . . . compromise his professional standards in order to please his client, the Court, or 
a third party’—Code para 307(c)), which makes it clear that you should never allow your 
personal values to override the requirements of the Code. However, within the boundaries 
provided by the Code, the Guidance available on the Bar Council and Bar Standards Board 
websites, and always remembering the availability of the Ethical Queries Helpline, the final 
decision is your responsibility. 
Suggested further reading: 
Andrew Boon and Jennifer Levin: The Ethics and Conduct of Lawyers in England and 
Wales (2nd ed. Oxford, Hart, 2008). This is the most up-to-date of the books suggested 
and explores the principles underlying the ethics of solicitors and barristers. It looks 
critically at the conflicts which may arise and the ways in which the ethical principles 
apply in different areas of lawyers’ work. 
Richard O’Dair: Legal Ethics: Text and Materials (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). This book covers the underlying principles of ethics as well as applying 
them to a variety of the situations in which lawyers find themselves. Many of the 
materials it provides are still valid, although some are out of date. It is particularly 
useful in that it contains problem questions and case studies. 
Donald Nicolson and Julian Webb: Professional Legal Ethics: Critical Interrogations 
(Oxford, OUP, 2000). This is a more theoretical book which provides a wide-ranging 
and critical analysis of the ethical principles of the English legal professions. 
